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Recent empirical studies suggest a need for a flexible patent regime responding to industry 
characteristics. In practice, sector-specific modifications of patent strength already exist but 
lack theoretical foundation. This paper intends to make up for this neglect by scrutinizing in 
what direction industry characteristics influence optimal patent strength. It is found that 
patents ought to be weaker, the more intense competition, the higher R&D productivity, and 
the more intricate reverse engineering are. Unlike similar step-by-step innovation models of 
economic growth, the model assumes Cournot competition and introduces an empirically 
substantiated measure of sector differences in the ability to catch up with the technological 
leader. It is found that for most empirically plausible cases the familiar inverted-U relation 
between patent length and growth carries over to the Cournot set-up. 
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Do stronger or weaker patent rights foster economic growth? Over the last decade numerous studies
have dealt with that very question, but results were rather ambiguous or inconclusive.1 Recent
empirical ﬁndings suggest a possible explanation for this inconclusiveness by ﬁnding vast industry
diﬀerences in how patent protection inﬂuences innovation and growth.2 Moser (2005), e.g., ﬁnds
that countries without patent protection historically specialized on industries for which patents are
less important, while innovative activity in countries with patent laws was more diversiﬁed. Hence,
stronger or weaker patent protection does not necessarily imply higher or lower R&D investments
in general. Instead, as changes of a cross-industry uniform patent protection alter the direction of
technological change, they induce more innovation in one type of industry at the expense of another.
An optimization of aggregate innovation and growth, therefore, implies the necessity to diﬀerentiate
patent protection according to each industry’s characteristics.
In practice, sector-speciﬁc modiﬁcations of that kind have already been implemented but lack
theoretical foundation. In 1992 the European Union introduced supplementary protection certiﬁ-
cates, which provide an up to ﬁve-year additional protection to pharmaceuticals and plant protection
products after the corresponding patents expire (Regulation (EEC) No. 1768/92). Their purpose is
to compensate for the loss of eﬀective patent term due to regulatory delays in the launch of new prod-
ucts. Recently, the EU issued a regulation according to which pediatric drugs receive a six-month
extension to the maximum supplementary protection term (Regulation (EC) No. 1901/2006). In
the US, a similar pediatric exclusivity came into force with the FDA Modernization Act of 1997
(section 505 (A)) in order to incentivize pediatric studies prior to approval of a new drug. In eco-
nomic patent literature, however, surprisingly little eﬀort has been made to theoretically develop a
ﬂexible patent regime responding to industry needs.
The goal of this paper is to make up for this neglect. Based on empirically and theoretically
substantiated measures of industry-speciﬁc characteristics, it will be scrutinized in what direction
these measures inﬂuence optimal patent strength. It is found that patent protection of a sector ought
to be weaker, the more intense its product market competition, the higher its R&D productivity,
and the more intricate reverse engineering are. Moreover, the model shows that, given a basic
speciﬁcation similar to previous Schumpeterian growth models with Bertrand competition3, the
familiar inverted-U relation between patent length and growth carries over to a Cournot set-up. The
basic speciﬁcation is extended by accounting for an empirically based measure of sector diﬀerences
in the ability to technologically catch up with the leader. It is found that, except in sectors with
fairly easy imitation, most empirically plausible cases still exhibit the inverted-U relation.
The model builds upon similar step-by-step innovation models by Aghion et al. (2001), Ace-
moglu/Akcigit (2008) and Acemoglu (2009), chapter 14.4., but instead of Bertrand competition, it
1 See, e.g., Branstetter/Sakakibara (2001), Falvey et al. (2006), Qian (2007), Lerner (2009), Mokyr (2009).
2 See Arora et al. (2003), Moser (2005), Bessen/Hunt (2007), and Gans et al. (2008). Earlier studies corroborate
these industry diﬀerences: see, e.g., Taylor/Silberston (1973), Mansﬁeld (1986) and Arundel/Kabla (1998).
3 See, e.g., Aghion et al. (2001) and Mukoyama (2003).
1assumes competition in quantities à la Cournot. In order to ensure comparability, the approach
follows Aghion et al. (2001) regarding how to model product market competition, but, as Ace-
moglu/Akcigit (2008), it introduces ﬂexible patent strength.
The idea behind a ﬂexible patent regime in general is that the extent of protection is conditional
on parameters inﬂuencing the patent oﬃce’s necessity to compensate innovators. The goal is to
minimize over- and under-compensations. Under-compensations undercut incentives to innovate
and lower society’s innovation rate, while over-compensations lead to more invention proﬁts than
socially optimal. Ideally, patent protection would be tailored to each innovation depending on R&D
costs and proﬁts accruing without governmental intervention, so that the inventor would exactly
break even. However, a diﬀerentiation of patent policy to such a high degree seems practically
inapplicable, since patent oﬃces would not only need to determine an idea’s patentability itself but
also the degree of that patentability. The former, which basically constitutes the current system,
already comprises considerable implementation costs and, due to information asymmetry between
inventor and patent oﬃce, uncertainty. An implementation of the latter appears to be illusory.
Do eﬀorts in favor of a ﬂexible patent regime have to end at this point? Not necessarily. But
patent authorities are in need of additional information in order to be able to, at least, approximate
the optimally diﬀerentiated strength of protection. Whether this approximation is related to the
ideal case of individual protection for every single invention or whether it needs to be aggregated on
a ﬁrm, industry or even country level depends on the availability of the additional information. With
regard to the nature of this information, two reasons come to mind for why the model presented
here focuses on the sector level. Firstly, as the patent oﬃce’s goal is to optimize the innovator’s
compensation, the additional knowledge ought to contain information about innovation incentives,
i.e., the trade-oﬀ between R&D costs and the capability to generate proﬁts in order to break
even. Especially the latter comprises market parameters (e.g., the degree of competition) which
are inherently obtained on a sectoral level. Secondly, even though some of the parameters, which
determine innovation incentives, are considered to be ﬁrm or innovation speciﬁc (e.g., a ﬁrm’s
capability to reverse engineer), the mentioned empirical studies imply that such information is
already available or is comparatively easy to obtain at sectoral level. Therefore, it is appropriate
to base theoretical considerations about ﬂexible patent policy upon these kinds of studies, and, to
that eﬀect, diﬀerentiate the strength of protection sector-speciﬁcally.
The model is most closely related to Acemoglu/Akcigit (2008) and Chu (2009). The former
build on a similar step-by-step innovation model but use the technological gap between ﬁrms to
determine ﬂexible patent strength. Due to the trickle-down eﬀect they ﬁnd it optimal to provide
stronger exclusive rights to technologically more advanced innovators, since more protection not
only provides higher incentives to the leader, but, via the prospect of becoming technological leader
himself, it also encourages the laggard to invent. Chu (2009) develops a quality-ladder growth model
with ﬂexible patent breadth depending on market size and technological opportunities. He ﬁnds
a substantial welfare gain from a diﬀerentiation across sectors. The model also relates to patent
2literature, which assumes asymmetric information on cost and value of innovations and suggests
ﬂexible protection to incite inventors to reveal information. Cornelli/Schankerman (1999) propose
to use renewal fees to diﬀerentiate optimal patent lives according to R&D productivity. Since they
consider productivity to be a good approximation for innovation value, they suggest that more
productive inventors ought to receive patents with longer lives. Scotchmer (1999) uses a similar
model but distinguishes between R&D costs and innovation value. Given that costs increase at least
proportionately to the quality of innovation, Scotchmer ﬁnds a menu of patents with ﬂexible length
to be optimal. Yet in contrast to Cornelli/Schankerman (1999), she also identiﬁes circumstances in
which a uniform patent regime can be optimal. Hopenhayn et al. (2006) reach similar conclusions
regarding the optimality of a patent menu but, in tradition of the patent design literature4, suggest
ﬂexible patent breadth while holding patent length ﬁxed. As the present model, they analyze
optimal patent policy considering the cumulative nature of innovations. However, their approach,
as well as the previously mentioned, advocates a diﬀerentiation of patent strength on ﬁrm or project
level. The paper presented here primarily diﬀers from hitherto existing models of ﬂexible patent
policy inasmuch as it proposes a sector-speciﬁc diﬀerentiation. With the exception of Chu (2009),
no other paper suggests ﬂexible patent strength based on industry diﬀerences coming to light in
numerous empirical studies. Yet, while Chu (2009) analyzes patent breadth and uses other variables
to diﬀerentiate protection, this model focuses on patent length and, thereby, provides the theoretical
basis to analyze industry-speciﬁc modiﬁcations of patent length already implemented in practice.
Moreover, while most mentioned models focus on only one parameter which determines ﬂexible
patent strength5, this approach accounts for three parameters: R&D productivity, reverse engineer-
ing capability, and the degree of product market competition. As described above, the ﬁrst one has
been used to diﬀerentiate patent strength in previous models of ﬂexible patent policy. The last two
proved to be relevant for innovation incentives in empirical studies. Mansﬁeld et al. (1981), e.g.,
discover sector-speciﬁc diﬀerences in imitation costs and the ability to reverse engineer, while Prasad
(2008) ﬁnds that the prediction of an inverted-U relation between competition and innovation by
Aghion et al. (2005) varies signiﬁcantly depending on industry characteristics.
The beneﬁt of taking three parameters into account instead of one is twofold. Firstly, it enables
us to compare their implications on ﬂexible patent protection in an integrating framework. Secondly,
since patent policy aims at compensating innovators and more than one parameter aﬀects the
necessity and the extent of governmental intervention to do that, the idea is to take on a broader
perspective on an inventor’s research incentives. O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse aptly state
" [...] that the eﬀectiveness of patent law in supporting research is seriously impeded by
the fact that it does not refer to costs or market structure in how patent protection is
circumscribed." 6
4 See, e.g., Gilbert/Shapiro (1990), Klemperer (1990), and Denicolo (1996).
5 That is with the exception of Scotchmer (1999), who models productivity and quality of R&D separately.
6 O’Donoghue et al. (1998), p. 25.
3The paper presented here intends to make a contribution to the rectiﬁcation of this shortcoming. An
innovating ﬁrm’s R&D decision comprises a trade-oﬀ between R&D costs and potential beneﬁts from
advancing one technology step, both depending on an interplay of the above-mentioned parameters.
To give an example, knowledge about an innovation’s market power is only useful together with
information about the length of the market power’s existence, because even a monopoly is useless,
if it only exists for an inﬁnitesimal short period. The market power’s existence, in turn, depends on
the rival’s ability to reverse engineer and to technologically catch up to the leader. For this reason,
the model utilizes the three parameters to answer the following questions regarding the decision to
innovate: i) How resource-consuming is the innovation?; ii) how much return can be expected from
it?; and iii) how long will the innovation yield proﬁt for?
The model takes advantage of the fact that R&D productivity can be seen as a measure for
R&D costs, since it quantiﬁes how productive a unit researcher is. It uses R&D productivity to
tackle question i) and to approximate the necessity to compensate innovators using patents. I ﬁnd
that more R&D productivity in an industry corresponds to shorter optimal patent life, because
incentives to innovate increase with a higher rate than incentives to imitate. This, in turn, results
from the fact that proﬁts from gaining technological lead always exceed proﬁts from catching up, and
a higher productivity simply scales up this diﬀerence. Hence, in sectors with a high productivity,
the threat of losing the technological lead (relative to innovation proﬁts) as well as the necessity
to compensate innovators via patents is relatively low. This result seems intuitive but contradicts
previous ﬁndings by Cornelli/Schankerman (1999) indicating that more productive inventors should
be granted longer protection in order to tilt their R&D eﬀort towards large inventions.
Furthermore, the degree of product market competition is used to evaluate question ii), since
it inﬂuences an industry’s natural ability to compensate innovators. I ﬁnd that more intense com-
petition corresponds to a weaker optimal patent protection. This seems counterintuitive but is
due to the fact that more competition increases incentives to escape it by outperforming the rivals
technologically. Since a sector’s naturally inherent research incentives are higher once it exhibits
less market concentration, the necessity to compensate innovators via patent protection diminishes.
Finally, question iii) will be dealt with by accounting for the laggard’s ability to reverse engineer,
since an innovator in a sector in which it is comparatively easy to imitate is under higher pressure to
break even. Using inter-industry diﬀerences in the imitator’s R&D productivity, the model suggests
that a decline in the sector-speciﬁc relation of imitation costs to innovation costs, i.e., more eﬃcient
reverse engineering, calls for higher patent protection. Since the threat of losing the technological
lead rises with less costly imitation, the necessity to protect innovators using IPR policy increases.
The paper is organized as follows. The basic framework of the underlying step-by-step inno-
vation model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 deals with the intuitive analysis and numeri-
cal calibration of how variations in sector-speciﬁc parameters induce changes in the optimal (i.e.,
growth-maximizing) amount of patent protection. Thereby, it gives an idea of the potential gains
of a ﬂexible patent regime on industry level. Section 4 concludes the paper.
42 The basic framework
2.1 Consumer behavior
Consider a continuous-time economy which is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived consumers
(normalized to 1). The representative household has additively separable intertemporal preferences




e t [lnc(t)   LS(t)]dt ; (1)
where  is the subjective discount rate, c(t) is consumption at date t and LS(t) denotes the labor
supplied. According to this preference speciﬁcation, labor supply is inﬁnitely elastic, so that the
wage rate w(t) is exogenous and can be normalized to 1 for all t.7 Consequently, the subjective
discount rate  equals the interest rate r(t) and expenditure in each sector j at time t can be chosen
as the numeraire, so that pAj(t)xAj(t) + pBj(t)xBj(t) = 1.8
Consumer goods are provided by a continuum of industries indexed by j 2 [0;1], so consumption
equals aggregate output Y (t) given by




where Xj(t) is the consumer good output of industry j. Each industry exhibits a duopolistic market
structure. Industry output Xj(t) consists of two varieties xAj(t) and xBj(t) produced by ﬁrms A
and B. Following Aghion et al. (2001) we have that
Xj(t) = [xAj(t)j + xBj(t)j]
1
j ; (3)
where j 2 (0;1] indicates the substitutability of one variety using the other.9 The index j refers to
the fact that  can diﬀer from sector to sector, which is an important feature for the sector-speciﬁc
diﬀerentiation of patent policy analyzed below.
Due to the logarithm in the utility function, which implies that in equilibrium consumers spend
the same amount in each industry, the demand function will take the same form in each industry.
So it is suﬃcient to derive the demand for one industry which is considered exemplary. Given (2)
7 This follows Aghion et al. (2001) and Mukoyama (2003). For similar models with inelastic labor supply see
Aghion et al. (1997) and Acemoglu (2009), ch. 14.4. This assumption does not change the intuition behind the
variations of proﬁts w.r.t. competition and technology gap. Yet, when labor supply is inelastic, the endogeneity
of wages leads to less drastic reactions of proﬁts to variations in those parameters. E.g., more rivalry leads to a
higher output, resulting in a higher demand for workers. Unlike inﬁnitely elastic labor supply, inelastic supply
causes wages to increase, which lowers proﬁts and incentives to innovate. Thus, given the results below, inelastic
supply would smooth the reaction to parameter variations quantitively, albeit qualitative eﬀects are identical.
8 To see that, optimize the Hamiltonian ~ H(t;c;A;LS;) = lnc(t) LS(t)+(t)[w(t)LS(t)+r(t)A(t) p(t)c(t)] :
This yields
1





p(t) c(t), which implies that the numeraire chosen corresponds to w(t) = 1. Since  = 1 always
holds, _  becomes zero, resulting in r(t) = .
9 Instead of assuming only one type of good, alternatively, Xj(t) can be interpreted as intermediate goods used
to produce one ﬁnal consumer good Y (t). In that case, (2) would be the Cobb-Douglas production function for
this good. Given a normalized ﬁnal good’s price (py(t) = 1), both approaches yield the same results.
5and (3) we maximize (1) subject to the above given budget constraint. This yields
pAj(t) =
xBj(t)j 1
xAj(t)j + xBj(t)j and pBj(t) =
xAj(t)j 1
xAj(t)j + xBj(t)j ; (4)
which is the (inverse) demand for consumer goods varieties.
2.2 Producer behavior
Unlike previous models of this type, which assume Bertrand competition, in this model ﬁrms com-
pete in quantities à la Cournot. While being slightly more intricate, assuming Cournot has the
advantage of being empirically more substantiated. Gisser/Sauer (2000), e.g., show that, unlike
other oligopolistic set-ups, Cournot is well in line with studies on the proﬁt-concentration relation.
Since our model also aims at providing a theoretical basis for the mentioned de facto diﬀerentiation
of patent length in practice, the Cournot assumption improves its empirical applicability.10
Each ﬁrm i in industry j produces its variety of the consumption good at time t using labor
Lij(t) and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc production knowledge Aij(t), so that
xij(t) = Aij(t)Lij(t) ; (5)
where i 2 fA;Bg. The two suppliers diﬀer regarding their endogenously determined technology
level, which pins down the productivity of a unit labor employed in production. Both ﬁrms can
invest in R&D, which stochastically leads to innovations. Each innovation manifests itself by raising
the investing ﬁrm’s technology level by one discrete standardized step  > 1. Technology of a ﬁrm
i, whose R&D eﬀorts succeded kij times, therefore, can be written as Aij(t) = kij(t). This can be
interpreted as the amount of consumer goods that one unit of labor can produce, or, put diﬀerently,
 kij(t) units of labor are required for production of one unit output. Hence, marginal cost of
producing consumer good j for ﬁrm i at time t is mij(t) =  kij(t) w(t). The technological leader
in each industry will be denoted by i and the laggard by  i, so that mij(t)  m ij(t).
Since in a duopolistic market a ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximizing quantities not only depend on its own






 k ij(t) w(t) =  nj(t), where i; i 2 fA;Bg and i 6=  i. nj(t) = kij(t)   k ij(t) is the
technology gap between leader and laggard, measured by the number of steps  the leader is ahead.
Hence, if there is a technology gap in industry j, the ratio of marginal costs is always smaller than
1 and the leader has a cost advantage, whose size positively correlates with the gap. In case of
nj(t) = 0, the industry exhibits neck-to-neck competition, and the ratio equals one.
In spite of uncertainty in the R&D-process, each ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize expected proﬁts,
because every consumer holds a balanced portfolio of shares of all ﬁrms. Using the demand functions





j  mij(t)xij(t), where i; i 2
10 Besides, if the following Proposition 1, which is a prerequisite for the proofs in the Appendix, holds under
Cournot, it holds under Bertrand a fortiori, since, there, proﬁts react more extreme than under Cournot.
6fA;Bg and i 6=  i. The ﬁrst-order conditions are
mij(t) =
jxij(t)j 1 x ij(t)j
(xij(t)j + x ij(t)j)2 and m ij(t) =
jx ij(t)j 1 xij(t)j
(xij(t)j + x ij(t)j)2 : (6)































Finally, using these expressions and (4), we can express the leader’s and laggard’s proﬁts in industry
j at time t conditional on the technology gap nj(t) and the substitutability measure j:
ij(t) =






 nj(t)j2 and  ij(t) =



























In spite of well-known limitations of this understanding, the industry-speciﬁc parameter j can
be used as an indicator of the degree of product market competition.11 This interpretation follows
Aghion et al. (2001), who state that, "although  is ostensibly a taste parameter, we think of it
as proxying the absence of institutional, legal or regulatory impediments to entering directly into a
rival ﬁrm’s market [...]. Under this interpretation  reﬂects in particular the inﬂuence of anti-trust
policy."12 Since j mathematically captures the extent to which one variety is able to generate a
utility similar to the other, it can be interpreted as a measure to what degree both varieties belong
to the same market and, therewith, engage in direct competition. The mentioned impediments to
enter a rival’s market (e.g., due to a more or less eﬃcient anti-trust policy) inﬂuence the resemblence
of both varieties with regard to the utility they generate. Thus an eﬃcient anti-trust policy, which
induces a high degree of competition, corresponds to the case where j is close to 1. By contrast,
the absence of an eﬃcient anti-trust policy corresponds to the case in which j is close to 0, since,
then, the varieties do not generate a similar utility and cannot substitute one another. Aghion et al.
(2001) substantiate this interpretation by additionally pointing out that j corresponds to standard
measures of competition, particularly the price cost margin.13 To ensure comparability and due to
quite intricate alternatives, I will henceforth refer to j as the degree of competition.
The proﬁt function (8) plays a crucial role in the model. As in every Schumpeterian growth
model it determines the beneﬁts of technologically outperforming the rivals. In step-by-step models
11 Regarding the limitations of this approach see Königer/Licandro (2004) and Boone et al. (2007).
12 See Aghion et al. (2001), p. 471.
















Figure 1: Proﬁts as a function of competition j and technological gap nj ( = 1:1).
of endogenous growth the proﬁt function is particularly important, because the potential innovator
weighs ex-post research proﬁts against its ex-ante revenue. So in contrast to leap-frogging models,
where R&D is always done by an outsider ﬁrm, what determines research incentives in this model is
not the overall research proﬁt but the diﬀerence between postinnovation and preinnovation proﬁts
and its behavior with respect to the technological gap. These incremental proﬁts are crucial for
R&D incentives of both, technological leader and laggard. It is, therefore, worth taking a closer
look at the characteristics of the proﬁt function ij = ij(j;nj(t);t) illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
The shape of the curve in ﬁgure 1 is in line with the well-known fact that oligopolistic competition
à la Cournot exhibits less extreme behavior than Bertrand price competition. While at j = 1 and in
neck-to-neck state (nj(t) = 0) price competition would yield a zero-proﬁt situation (see Aghion et al.
(2001)), Cournot ensures proﬁts for both ﬁrms (ij(1;0;t) = 0:25). The reason is the more long-term
character of competition in quantities mentioned above, due to which producers are not able to react
as ﬂexible to the competitor’s supply as in the course of price competition. In the other extreme case
of j ! 0, in which both varieties are complementary goods, the industry exhibits no product market
competition. Consequently, the extent to which both producers diﬀer technologically becomes
irrelevant for the proﬁts, so that both ﬁrms’ proﬁts will be lim
j!0
ij(j;nj(t);t) = 0:5 regardless
of their R&D eﬀort. Besides, in a Cournot oligopoly even the technologically less advanced ﬁrm is
able to realize proﬁts to a certain degree. Only a very large technological gap causes the laggard’s
proﬁts to asymptotically become zero, while the leader’s proﬁts increase asymptotically to 1, so
that lim
n! 1
 ij(j;nj(t);t) = 0 and lim
n!1ij(j;nj(t);t) = 1.
Figure 1 shows that, as j increases, the leader-laggard diﬀerence in proﬁts becomes increasingly
sharp, and the relationship between technological lead and proﬁts assumes the shape of a logistic
8function. This is an important feature regarding the discussion of optimal patent protection below,
because incremental (not total) proﬁts are the main driving force of innovation incentives in this
model. A logistic shaped function exhibits an inﬂection point which separates the convex part
of the function (small nj(t)) from the concave part (high nj(t)). This implies that a leader with
a large technological advantage has relatively little incentives to innovate, because the diﬀerence
between preinnovative and postinnovative proﬁts is small for high nj(t). By contrast, given a small
productivity diﬀerence between technological leader and laggard, the logistic function exhibits a
steep slope, and the potential R&D beneﬁts for an innovator are high. Figure 2 illustrates the
logistic behavior of the proﬁt function w.r.t. nj(t) for the most distinct case of j = 1.










Convex part Concave part
Figure 2: Proﬁts as a function of the technological gap nj (j = 1,  = 1:1).
Finally, it can be shown formally, that total industry proﬁts are lower in neck-to-neck competition
than if one ﬁrm has a cost advantage, i.e., ij(j;nj(t);t)+ ij(j; nj(t);t) > 2ij(j;0;t). To
see this, remember that for negative nj(t) the proﬁt function is convex. If the inﬂection point of the
logistic is ninflection > 0, the function still exhibits a convex behavior at neck-to-neck competition
nj(t) = 0 (see ﬁgure 2). This would connote that an innovator trying to escape the neck-to-neck state





@nj(t) jnj(t)= n > 0 or expressed diﬀerently ij(j;nj(t);t)   ij(j;0;t) >
 ij(j;0;t)    ij(j; nj(t);t). So in order to show that (8) exhibits the lowest total industry
proﬁts if ﬁrms are neck-to-neck, we need to prove that ninflection > 0.
Proposition 1. Given two ﬁrms competing à la Cournot in an industry j, whose proﬁt function
follows (8), incremental proﬁts of a ﬁrm i leaving neck-to-neck state are strictly greater than in-
cremental proﬁts of a catching up ﬁrm  i, i.e., ij(j;nj(t);t)   ij(j;0;t) >  ij(j;0;t)  
 ij(j; nj(t);t) for all j 2 (0;1], all nj(t) 2 N and i; i 2 fA;Bg with i 6=  i.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
9It follows, that even though the innovator experiences the highest increase in incremental proﬁts
at ninflection, total industry proﬁts are lowest and, therefore, exhibit the highest potential increase
via innovation, if ﬁrms compete neck to neck. This property, which Aghion et al. (2001) show
for a proﬁt function resulting from Bertrand competition, carries over to the Cournot set-up.14 It
enables us to reason in the following that neck-to-neck R&D investments are strictly greater than
R&D investments by the laggard. This, in turn, is an important prerequisite for the analysis of the
optimal patent strength’s behavior to changes in sector-speciﬁc variables in section 3.
2.3 R&D and patent protection
The model does not allow for entry in R&D, so each industry’s R&D sector comprises two duopolists.
Both conduct research in order to advance technologically and lower their marginal costs for pro-
duction. Each industry can either be in neck-to-neck state, where the technological gap is zero,
or in leader-laggard state. Following Aghion et al. (1997), Mukoyama (2003), and Aghion et al.
(2005), I restrict the maximum permissable lead to one step. This assumption implies that, if the
leader innovates, the laggard automatically catches up by one step, as technology older than one
step becomes common knowledge. Consequently, a leader does not further invest in research.15
For now, both ﬁrms exhibit identical R&D costs regardless of being leader or laggard.16 Innova-
tions occur stochastically and follow a memoryless Poisson process, whose arrival rate is determined
by investments in R&D (in units of labor). More speciﬁcally, we focus on the case in which the
innovation possibilities frontier for a ﬁrm i in industry j is 'ij(t) =
p
2j Rij(t), where 'ij(t) is the
ﬂow rate of innovation, j > 0 is the R&D productivity in industry j, and Rij(t) is the number of
workers employed in research by ﬁrm i in industry j.17 Consequently, R&D costs in units of labor





(10) enables us to simplify the ﬁrst derivative of G('ij(t)) w.r.t. 'ij(t) to
@ G('ij(t))
@ 'ij(t) = 1
j 'ij(t).
This will turn out to be useful regarding the derivation of R&D intensities, because it makes sure
that the optimal neck-to-neck R&D intensity is independent of the optimal laggard’s intensity.
14 See Proposition 1c) in Aghion et al. (2001), p. 472.
15 This one-step lead assumption has no distortionary impact on the results, if the parameter speciﬁcation of proﬁts
and R&D costs is such that the leader is not able to break even when introducing self-replacing innovations (see
Mukoyama (2003), p. 369). Aghion et al. (2001) give an example for a speciﬁcation that fulﬁlls this no
self-replacement condition: large innovations. Given  > 0, for large  even a one-step lead is suﬃcient to
raise return on innovation to almost maximum level. This leaves relatively little potential to further augment
proﬁts by making additional eﬀort to expand the technological frontier. However, even if the no self-replacement
requirement is not met, the one-step lead assumption turns out to be a useful, albeit not particularly precise
approximation of the intuition behind the following results, as it enables us to derive optimal R&D intensities
analytically. Aghion et al. (2001) show that the main results regarding the behavior of g
 to changes of patent
length carry over to the self-replacement case of small innovations. So considering the fact, that the qualitative
implications behind (8) remain unchanged, the lack of precision seems a little price to pay for simplicity.
16 This assumption will be lifted in section 3.4, where we take a closer look at variations in the ease of imitation.
17 See also Budd et al. (1993), Aghion et al. (1997), Aghion et al. (2005), who use a similar R&D speciﬁcation.
10The basic model includes two alternative ways for the laggard to catch up with the leader. Firstly,
we assume a patent regime that, if enforced perfectly, leaves inventing around as the only possibility
to draw level with the leader. I.e., if the patent never expires, the imitator has to achieve the same
technological level by means of a variation of the leader’s idea. The variation has to be large enough
not to violate the existing patent but, still, technologically serve the purpose of reducing production
costs of consumer goods at the same rate as the patented idea. This speciﬁcation, explicitly used in
Acemoglu/Akcigit (2008) and Acemoglu (2009), implies a standardized scope of patent protection,
i.e., patent breadth, which deﬁnes the technical bandwidth of protection, is neither zero nor inﬁnitely
high. If it were the latter, it would be impossible to invent around and it would make no sense for the
laggard to invest in research. If it were the former, patent length would become virtually ineﬀective,
since an inﬁnitesimal technical variation of the imitation compared to the patented product would
be enough not to violate the patent. Secondly, we allow for the possibility that patents expire at
a Poisson rate hj, where hj > 0 and the index j indicates the possibility of an industry-speciﬁc
diﬀerentiation of patent length, discussed below. If expiration occurs, the imitator can copy the
idea without having to invest additional time and eﬀort in inventing around.
2.4 Steady State Equilibrium
2.4.1 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Following Acemoglu (2009), the next step is to derive optimal R&D intensities, where we denote
'0j(t) as the R&D decision of a neck-to-neck ﬁrm, '1j(t) of the leader and ' 1j(t) of the laggard.
We further denote 0j(t) as the probability that an industry is in neck-to-neck state and 1j(t) as
the probability that an industry’s technology gap equals one (leader-laggard state). In equilibrium,
the optimal R&D intensities in the dynamic problem setting under consideration require being
optimal responses to each other, given the history of the state variable to be subgame perfect.
Yet, in accordance with Aghion et al. (2001), Acemoglu/Akcigit (2008) and Acemoglu (2009),
we can further simplify by focussing on symmetric stationary Markov Perfect Equilibria, as the
including Markov strategies only depend on the payoﬀ-relevant state of the game (each ﬁrm’s current
technological state) and not on its historic values.
The list of decisions a ﬁrm i has to make can be expressed by Dn(t)  d'nj(t);xij(t);pij(t)c,
where i 2 fA;Bg and nj(t) 2 f0;1g. Futhermore, D indicates the whole sequence of decisions of
ﬁrms at every state, so D(t)  fD1(t);D0(t);D 1(t)g. An allocation is given by time paths of
decisions of ﬁrms, [D(t)]1
t=0, by the time path of the interest rate [r(t)]1
t=0, and by the time paths
of each industry’s probability distribution regarding technology gaps [nj(t)]1
t=0.18 The Markov
Perfect Equlibrium is represented by time paths [D(t);r(t);Y (t)]1
t=0 such that
18 This set up follows the similar step-by-step growth model with Bertrand competition by Acemoglu (2009), section









t=0 are stochastic (since they include kij(t) via mij(t)), we ignore their stochastic





t=0 implied by [D(t)]1
t=0 satisfy (7) and (9),
b) R&D policies ['(t)]1
t=0 maximize the expected proﬁts of the respective ﬁrms taking ag-
gregate output [Y (t)]1
t=0, interest rate [r(t)]1
t=0 and the optimal R&D investment choices
of the rival ﬁrm ['(t)]1
t=0 as given,
c) aggregate output [Y (t)]1
t=0 is given by (2), and
d) the stock market clears at all times given [r(t)]1
t=0.
The stock market channels consumer savings to R&D projects by valuating each innovation
according to the expected discounted proﬁts it generates. The associated risk can be neglected
since households hold a balanced portfolio of shares of all ﬁrms. Because one of the two ﬁrms will
surely be the next innovator, this diversiﬁcation leads to the fact that there is no risk premium.
Shareholders receive two kinds of returns on assets: ﬁrstly, in form of dividends, which in the current
context corresponds to proﬁts given by (8), and secondly, in form of an appreciation in ﬁrm value,
that the innovator experiences due to a change in the state variable (technological level). The
stock market will be in equilibrium, if the asset pays out the required rate of return r(t) = . The
corresponding no-arbitrage condition for the stock market implies an annuity given by the following
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation (in stationary form, as we analyze the steady-state):
r(t)Vn(t)   _ Vn(t) = max
'nj(t)
h[nj(t)   G('nj(t))] + 'nj(t)[Vn+1(t)   Vn(t)]
 (' nj(t) + hj)[Vn(t)   V0(t)]i ; (11)
where n 2 f0;1g. Vn(t) is the value of a ﬁrm with lead n, and _ Vn(t) is the change of this value
with respect to time.19 (11) is also refered to as the no-arbitrage asset value equation. The return
on investment on the right hand side comprises the proﬁts minus R&D cost, the increase in the
ﬁrm’s value due to innovation weighted by the probability that it succeeds, and the decrease in the
ﬁrm’s value due to the rival’s innovation weighted by the probability that the rival succeeds. The
expression plays a crucial role in the following derivation of steady-state R&D decisions.
2.4.2 Steady-state R&D decisions
Since in steady-state the aggregate growth rate g of the economy, as well as proﬁts, industry
structure, and R&D intensities are constant over time, we can drop their time subscript in the
following calculations.20 In order to derive the steady-state R&D intensities, we use the above
19 Note that in a model speciﬁcation, in which consumers’ saving behavior follows a standard Euler Equation
(g =
_ c(t)
c(t) = r(t)   ), _ Vn grows at the same rate as consumption. Since here r(t) = , there is no saving
additional to the rate of time depreciation, so _ Vn = 0. Both yield the same annuity Vn paid to the investors.
20 The reason for this stationarity is that those variables, as opposed to output, prices and marginal costs, only
depend on the technology gap nj, but not on the constantly expanding technology level of the respective ﬁrm,
kij(t). Consequently, proﬁts 1j, 0j,  1j, industry structure 1j, 0j, value functions V1j, V0j, V 1j, and R&D
intensities '0j, ' 1j are stationary in steady state.
12given no-arbitrage asset value equation, (11), and the fact that r =  to write the leader’s value
function
V1j = 1j   (e ' 1j + hj)[V1j   V0j] ; (12)







+ '0j [V1j   V0j]   e '0j [V0j   V 1j] ; (13)







+ (' 1j + hj)[V0j   V 1j] ; (14)
where  denotes all variables chosen by the rival ﬁrm. Based on these functions, we can derive the
proﬁt maximizing amount of labor employed in research by taking the ﬁrst derivative with respect
to the steady-state R&D intensities for each ﬁrm respectively. Note that, due to the one-step lead
assumption, the optimal research level of the leading ﬁrm is zero. The ﬁrst order conditions are
'0j
j
= (V1j   V0j) (15)
for a neck-to-neck ﬁrm, and
' 1j
j
= (V0j   V 1j) (16)
for the laggard. Expressions (12) to (16) suﬃce for being able to derive the proﬁt maximizing R&D
intensities of both ﬁrms. Starting with the neck-to-neck ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order condition, we can use
(12) and (13) to rewrite (15) to 
'0j













Rearranging this expression yields the proﬁt maximizing R&D intensity of a neck-to-neck ﬁrm:
'0j =  ( + hj) +
q
( + hj)
2 + 2j (1j   0j) : (17)
Similarly, we can derive the proﬁt maximizing R&D intensity of the laggard, which yields
' 1j =  ( + hj + '0j) +
q
( + hj + '0j)2 + 2j (0j    1j) + ('0j)2 : (18)
Equations (17) and (18) are (along with the growth rate) the main equations in this model. On
the one hand, they include R&D incentives determining parameters, which in section 3 determine
ﬂexible patent scope. R&D productivity j enters the expressions directly, while the degree of
competition j enters both equations via incremental proﬁts. On the other hand, the expressions
capture the eﬀects imposed by patent protection on the ﬁrm’s R&D-behavior. The neck-to-neck
R&D intensity decreases with a lower patent protection, i.e., an increase in hj results in a strict
decrease of '0j. This fact reﬂects the disincentive eﬀect of a mitigation of patent strength. It
manifests itself in the rather intuitive result that the sooner the technological lead will be taken
13away from a ﬁrm, the less this ﬁrm is apt to invest in achieving the lead in the ﬁrst place.
Regarding the impact of a change in hj on imitation, the picture is less clear-cut. Solely taking
a look at (18) for the impact of an ease of patent strength on imitation yields the counter-intuitive
result, that lower patent protection strictly reduces imitation. However, considering that catching
up occurs via inventing around (' 1j) and via the expiration of the leader’s patents (hj), a reduction
of imitative research turns out to be a logical reaction to the fact, that catching up with the leader
has been alleviated without having to invest more ressources in inventing around.
2.4.3 Steady-state industry structure and growth rate
In order to obtain the growth rate, it turns out to be useful to derive the structure of each indus-
try, i.e., each industry’s probability of being in neck-to-neck and leader-laggard state respectively,
denoted by nj, where 0 < nj < 1. Since nj 2 f0;1g, we can write 0j + 1j = 1. The probability
distribution of technology gaps depends on optimal R&D intensities (17) and (18), because a higher
intensity in one technological state makes an industry less likely to remain in that state. For exam-
ple, if neck-to-neck competition in an industry is very intense, ﬁrms will try to achieve an advantage
over their rival as soon as possible and invest in R&D to escape competition. Consequently, the
probability for that industry to be in neck-to-neck is relatively small.
Since nj itself is stationary, the probability of going into the state of gap nj must equal the
probability of leaving that state. For the neck-to-neck state this yields 1j (' 1j + hj) = 20j '0j.
Aside from the laggard’s R&D intensity, the left hand side contains the ﬂow rate of patent expiration,
as both are alternative ways of catching up with the leader. The right hand side represents the ﬂow
out of the neck-to-neck state and includes two times the proﬁt maximizing R&D levels, because
both ﬁrms simultaneously try to become the next leader. Since 1j = 1   0j, it follows that
0j =
' 1j + hj
2'0j + ' 1j + hj
: (19)
The sector’s probability of ﬁnding itself in neck-to-neck state equals the share of the arrival rate of
(inventing around) imitations plus the Poisson hazard rate of patent expiration in the total arrival
rate of any ﬁrm advancing by one technological step. Similarly, we can write
1j =
2'0j
2'0j + ' 1j + hj
: (20)
Using these expressions, we can derive the steady-state growth rate. In a similar model, Aghion
et al. (2001) use the fact that aggregate output equals lnY =
R 1
0 lnXj dj (see (2)). Each industry’s
output Xj grows according to its innovations, whose occurrence follows an i.i.d. stochastic process.
Aghion et al. (2001), thus, assume that the aggregate steady-state growth rate g = _ Y = dlnY
dt and




In contrast to that, in this model one sector’s growth rate cannot be considered representative
for aggregate growth, since here we analyze inter-industry diﬀerences by assuming substantially
14diﬀerent parameters constituting the market situation in each sector. Consequently, while the
above speciﬁcation implies that g = lim
t!1
lnX1+lnX2+:::+lnXj
j t = lim
t!1
j lnXj
j t as industry
outputs expand symmetrically in the long run, the aggregate growth rate under the assumption




j t . In order to maximize aggregate growth we,
therefore, need to take variations in sector characteristics into account and maximize each sector’s
growth rate given by the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. Let an industry be characterized by its degree of competition j, its R&D produc-
tivity j, and the sector-speciﬁc strength of patent protection hj. Given the ﬁrm’s proﬁts in this
industry follow (8), their R&D decisions follow (17) and (18), and the industry’s probability of




2'0j (' 1j + hj)
2'0j + ' 1j + hj

ln : (21)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
A sector’s output grows with each step a neck-to-neck ﬁrm advances technologically. This occurs
at a probability determined by the optimal R&D intensity of neck-to-neck ﬁrms, '0j. Hence, at ﬁrst
glance, it seems that the laggard’s R&D-intensity, ' 1j, is not relevant for growth. Yet imitation
exhibits an indirect growth eﬀect via the probability that the sector is in neck-to-neck state, 0j.
The higher the laggard’s propensity to catch up, the more likely the respective sector is in neck-to-
neck state. Consequently, imitation has positive inﬂuence on growth by bringing the industry back
into the state, in which both ﬁrms engage in innovative research.
A similar observation can be made with regard to the impact of changes in patent protection on
growth. While the described disincentive eﬀect of lower patent protection on '0j naturally results
in less growth, a relaxation of patent strength can have the opposite growth eﬀect by increasing
the sector’s probability of being in neck-to-neck state. This so-called composition eﬀect of patent
protection on growth can, depending on the strength of hj, mitigate or overcompensate the dis-
incentive eﬀect. Growth hence exhibits an ambivalent reaction to changes in patent strength. In
order to show this ambivalence mathematically, it is useful to set up the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. Consider an industry j, in which R&D costs are given by (10), and optimal research
intensities are given by (17) and (18), where  > 0, j > 0, and hj  0. Under the premise that
Proposition 1 holds true, it follows that a) '0j > 0 and ' 1j > 0, and b) '0j > ' 1j.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
It follows from Proposition 3 that the growth rate given by Proposition 2 is strictly positive.




@hj is strictly greater than zero for small hj and strictly smaller than zero for large hj.
This implies that increasing hj in a relatively strict patent regime yields a positive growth eﬀect
15(disincentive eﬀect < composition eﬀect), while doing the same in a relatively weak regime yields a
negative growth eﬀect (composition eﬀect < disincentive eﬀect). Aghion et al. (2001) show this for
a Bertrand oligopoly. Proposition 3 ensures that '0j > ' 1j carries over to the Cournot set-up.














'0j > 0, ' 1j > 0 and '0j > ' 1j, both expressions are strictly less than zero, so
@'0j
@hj < 0 and
@' 1j
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From this expression it can be infered that the growth rate’s reaction to changes in patent strength
is ambivalent (see Appendix A.6). Moreover, (22) is an important prerequisite for the analysis of
the behavior of optimal patent strength, which will be subject to the following section.
3 Diﬀerentiation of patent protection
3.1 Objectives, motivation, and benchmark values of the numerical calibration
Based on the framework in section 2, we can now address the question how sector-speciﬁc pa-
rameters can serve as independent variables determining the ﬂexible component of a diﬀerentiated
patent regime, and, more speciﬁcally, how variations in their scale change the optimal (i.e., growth-
maximizing) patent strength. Recall from the introduction that the parameters determining the
variation of patent strength in this model are: R&D productivity j, the degree of product market
competition j, and the imitator’s capability to reverse engineer j (see 3.4). All three have an im-
pact on the innovator’s R&D-decision by inﬂuencing i) how resource-consuming is the innovation,
ii) how much return can be expected from it, and iii) how long will the innovation yield proﬁt for.
They can, therefore, be used to approximate sector-speciﬁc diﬀerences in innovation incentives.
In order to ﬁnd the growth-maximizing patent strength for each sector, the next step would be
to ﬁnd the root of (22). The solution would be a function h
j = h
j(j;j;j), whose ﬁrst derivative
w.r.t. any one of those three variables needs to be zero for uniform patent policy to be optimal,
while deviance from zero would indicate optimality of a sector-speciﬁc diﬀerentiation of patent
strength. However, ﬁnding the root of (22) requires solving a sextic equation, which according to
the Abel-Ruﬃni Theorem cannot be solved in radicals.21 In the following we, therefore, concentrate
on numerical calibrations in order to scrutinize the optimal sector-speciﬁc patent protection.
The numerical analysis aims not at providing a detailed calibration of the modeled economy.
Instead, its purpose is to highlight the growth rate’s reaction to changes in patent strength on the
one side, and the three sector diﬀerences determining variables on the other. I follow Mehra/Prescott
(1985), who ﬁnd an average real return on S&P 500 ﬁrms between 1889 and 1978 of 6.98 %, and
set the annual discount rate to  = 0:07 throughout the calibration. The parameter speciﬁcation
21 Regarding the Abel-Ruﬃni Theorem see King (1996). For the sextic equation itself please contact the author.
16will be geared to a benchmark case, in which patent length will be in accordance with the standard
TRIPs term of patent protection, hj;benchmark = 0:0522, and the extant parameters will be speciﬁed
so that the sector-speciﬁc growth rate in the benchmark case equals 2 %, which is consistent with
the average US GDP per capita growth from 1950 to 1994, reported by Jones (2005).23 This implies
j;benchmark = 0:8, j;benchmark = 5 and benchmark = 1:1.24 Depending on which of the three patent
diﬀerentiation determining variables is under consideration, I will check for robustness of the results
by gradually deviating from these benchmark values.
3.2 Sector-speciﬁc product market competition
Empirical ﬁndings on the impact of product market competition on innovation and growth are
mixed. While Blundell et al. (1995) ﬁnd a negative correlation and, thereby, corroborate the
implications of basic Schumpeterian growth models (e.g., Aghion/Howitt (1992)), Nickell (1996)
and Blundell et al. (1999) ﬁnd the opposite eﬀect. In their seminal empirical paper Aghion et al.
(2005) integrate the opposing ﬁndings and empirically scrutinize an inverted-U relation between
competition and innovation. Subsequent studies, however, cannot fully substantiate the inverted-
U relation.25 Prasad (2008) explains this with the composition of industries in the underlying
data sets, as sector-speciﬁc characteristics have crucial impact on the inverted-U’s existence. By
testing the prediction of an inverted-U for several sectors separately, he ﬁnds a wide variation across
industries. The model presented here accounts for these sector diﬀerences by modelling the familiar
Schumpeterian eﬀect and escape competition eﬀect of competition on innovation depending on j.26
How should a ﬂexible optimal patent life react to changes in a sector’s product market compe-
tition? j aﬀects (17) and (18) via incremental proﬁts of an innovator advancing one technological
step (1j   0j) and of an imitator catching up (0j    1j). In ﬁgure 3 it becomes apparent that
incremental proﬁts of neck-to-neck ﬁrms that innovate grow with j, regardless of the size of in-
novations. Even for small , where proﬁts decrease with j (l.h.s. of ﬁgure 3), incremental proﬁts
increase, because neck-to-neck proﬁts decline with a higher rate than proﬁts of the leader. Hence,
R&D-investments in neck-to-neck state are more worthwhile the higher the degree of competition,
because a ﬁrm can escape competition by innovating (escape competition eﬀect). Consequently,
the fact that an industry’s naturally inherent research incentives are higher, when it exhibits more
intense competition, mitigates the necessity to compensate innovators via patent protection.
By contrast, the Schumpeterian eﬀect implies that more competition destroys incentives to
22 Part II, sect. 5, art. 33 of the TRIPs Agreement stipulates a patent length not less than 20 years. Since we set
 = 0:07, a standardized time intervall corresponds to one year. Thus, 20 years of expiration implies hj = 0:05.
23 See Jones (2005), p. 1091, who ﬁnds an average growth rate of 1.95 %.
24 The latter value lies within the parameter range used in numerical calibrations of similar models: e.g. Aghion
et al. (2001) set innovation size to  = 1:135; Mukoyama (2003) gives an example in which  = 1:09; Ace-
moglu/Akcigit (2008) choose  = 1:05 and, then, check the robustness of the results with  = 1:01 and  = 1:2.
25 See, e.g., Poldahl/Tingvall (2006) and Prasad (2008).
26 See regarding the eﬀects Aghion et al. (2001), Mukoyama (2003), and Aghion et al. (2005). Note that, compared
to the latter, this model tends to marginalize the Schumpeterian eﬀect. This is because, ﬁrstly, in a Cournot
dyopoly the laggard’s incremental proﬁts are less likely to drop with an increase in j, and, secondly, unlike
Aghion et al. (2005), changes in j are assumed to aﬀect not only 0j, but 1j and  1j as well.
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Figure 3: Neck-to-neck, leader and laggard proﬁts’ reaction to changes in j (left:  = 1:2, right:  = 25).
innovate. This becomes apparent by taking a closer look at the laggard’s incremental proﬁts for
large  and their ambivalent reaction to an increase of j (r.h.s. of ﬁgure 3). While for small j
0j   1j rise with an increase of j, for high j they begin to fall again. The latter aspect induces
imitative research to decline (Schumpeterian eﬀect). The ambivalence only becomes apparent for
high , because, unlike Bertrand, in the Cournot set-up the laggard still generates proﬁts, if  is
small. Only if  is large, he ﬁnds himself in a zero-proﬁt situation, even when j is not close to 1.







for all j 2 (0;1]. It follows that the discrepancy between innovating and catching up incremental
proﬁts increases with more intense competition. Again, the implication for optimal patent strength
is that more competition corresponds to less protection, since the threat of losing the technological
edge over the rival and, to that extent, the necessity to compensate the innovator diminishes.
Larger R&D incentives for leader and laggard when competition is more intense and, more
importantly, the increasing gap between those incentives also inﬂuence optimal R&D intensities.
Variations of (17) and (18) with competition are induced solely by changes of incremental proﬁts.







for any j 2 (0;1] and  > 1. Expression (24) has crucial impact on the composition of growth rate
(21) inasmuch as it induces that components of the latter react diﬀerently to changes in j. The
fact that the relation of imitative to innovate research falls with more intense competition, mitigates
the composition eﬀect. This, in turn, suggests a higher need to weaken patent protection, since a
high neck-to-neck R&D-intensity is useless without imitation.
18What can we infer from the analysis so far with regard to the growth rate’s reaction on variations
of product market competition? All three theoretical implications of changes in j derived up to
this point suggest that a more intense competition corresponds to a lower optimal patent strength.
The next step is to carry out a numerical calibration to test these deliberations. As it turns out, the
benchmark case, which is shown in ﬁgure 4, corroborates the intuitive results derived before (see
Result 2). Besides, it renders possible to substantiate the ambivalence of the growth rate’s reaction
















Figure 4: The growth rate’s reaction to changes in patent length and product market competition j in the
benchmark case ( = 1:1,  = 0:07, j = 5).
Result 1. Given identical R&D costs for leader and laggard, the ambivalent reaction of growth to
changes in patent length, shown in Appendix A.6, takes the form of an inverted-U relationship.
In Appendices B.2 and B.3 it is shown that this result is robust to numerous variations in parameter
speciﬁcations over the given range of values for each parameter. Hence, we can infer that the familiar
inverted-U relationship between growth and patent protection, inter alia established by similar step-
by-step models with Bertrand competition27, carries over to a Cournot set-up. Result 1 is consistent
with empirical ﬁndings of Comanor (1967) and Qian (2007).28 Moreover, since the inverted-U’s
maximum represents the growth-maximizing patent strength, this characteristic relation between
growth and patent protection implies that the calibration yields an unambiguous solution for the
optimal (diﬀerentiated) patent strength within a realistic parameter range.
27 See, e.g., Aghion et al. (2001) and Mukoyama (2003), where the latter uses a slightly diﬀerent interpretation of
the relevant parameter. In a related theoretical model Horowitz/Lai (1996) ﬁnd an inverted-U relation between
patent length and innovation, resulting from two opposing eﬀects similar to the ones present in this model.
28 Comanor (1967) observes that too high and too low technical entry barriers impair research incentives. Qian
(2007) ﬁnds the existence of an optimal patent level above which stronger protection discourages innovation.
19Result 2. Given a duopolistic sector j, whose growth rate follows (21), an increase in the sector-
speciﬁc degree of product market competition implies an according adaptation of optimal patent
protection in the form of shorter diﬀerentiated patent lives and vice versa.
This result, also, is robust to numerous variations of parameter values (see Appendix B.2).
3.3 Sector-specﬁc R&D productivity
The idea of ﬂexible patent length according to a sector’s R&D productivity can be traced back to
the seminal work of Nordhaus (1969). Based on a simple model trading oﬀ dynamic eﬃciency and
static ineﬃciency of patents, the model implies that, under the assumption of a concave welfare
function, a higher productivity corresponds to a shorter optimal patent life. Using a similar but more
elaborated model, Cornelli/Schankerman (1999) reach the opposite conclusion. They assume large
technology steps to be of socially higher value than many small steps, because signiﬁcant inventions
are more likely to generate positive externalities and the related products obtain a lower elasticity
of demand. Due to the resulting convex welfare function, they ﬁnd that more productive inventors
should be granted longer protection in order to tilt their R&D eﬀort towards large inventions.
In contrast to these welfare models, the approach presented here accounts for sequential in-
novations and, thereby, focuses on dynamic eﬃciency and its trade oﬀ between innovation and
imitation. The model also diﬀers from the previous inasmuch as it explicitly models the ﬁrms’
competitive behavior, instead of assuming a given relation between R&D output and proﬁts. Un-
der this speciﬁcation it contradicts the result of Cornelli/Schankerman (1999) and reestablishes the
rather intuitive implication of the Nordhaus model. A sector-speciﬁc patent regime depending on
an industry’s level of R&D costs ought to grant greater protection to those sectors, which require
more intense research to take a technological step forward. Since the level of R&D costs can be
approximated by a measure for how productive a researcher in one sector is compared to another,
we utilize a sector’s average R&D productivity to determine its optimal patent strength.
As opposed to product market competition, R&D productivity j has direct impact on (17) and
(18) by rescaling incremental proﬁts of neck-to-neck and catching up ﬁrms. According to (10), a
higher productivity leads to a lower need for researchers to achieve a given ﬂow rate of innovation
and, to that extent, lower R&D costs. Put diﬀerently, a higher productivity implies that the same
amount of workers employed in research potentially generates an innovation sooner, so that higher
proﬁts accrue to the innovating ﬁrm. It becomes apparent that a higher j yields stronger incentives
to innovate and, therewith, higher optimal research intensities of neck-to-neck and following ﬁrms.
The extent to which '0j and ' 1j react to changes in R&D productivity diﬀers, however. This
follows from Proposition 1. Since incremental proﬁts of neck-to-neck ﬁrms are always greater than







20As a consequence, by altering the relation between imitative and innovative research, changes
in R&D productivity have crucial impact on growth and optimal patent strength. For instance, a
higher sector-speciﬁc productivity induces a stronger increase in innovative R&D incentives than
in the propensity to imitate. Hence, the sector under consideration is less likely to be in neck-to-
neck and the composition eﬀect on growth declines. It follows, that optimal (diﬀerentiated) patent
strength decreases with higher j, since more imitation is needed in order to increase the probability
to be in neck-to-neck state and to beneﬁt from the increased innovation incentives in that state.
An alternative way to think of it is to consider the interpretation of j as a measure for R&D
costs. An average research project in an industry, that exhibits a smaller j, is more expensive than
average projects in sectors with a higher productivity. That is why in the latter kind of sectors the
necessity for patent authorities to intervene and compensate innovators is lower than in the former
kind of sectors. A ﬂexible patent regime adjusting the strength of protection according to R&D
















Figure 5: The growth rate’s reaction to changes in patent length and R&D productivity j in the benchmark
case ( = 1:1,  = 0:07, j = 0:8).
The numerical analysis of the reaction of optimal patent strength to changes in sector-speciﬁc
R&D productivity corroborates this reasoning. Figure 5 illustrates that, similar to the case of
product market competition, the maxima of the inverted-U relationship correspond to higher h
j,
the higher sector-speciﬁc R&D productivity j is. Hence, we can state
Result 3. Given a duopolistic sector j, whose growth rate follows (21), an increase in the sector-
speciﬁc R&D productivity implies an according adaptation of optimal patent protection in the form
of shorter diﬀerentiated patent lives and vice versa.
This result is robust to numerous variations of parameter values (see Appendix B.3).
213.4 Sector-speciﬁc imitation costs
The necessity for governmental intervention to compensate innovators via patent policy originates
from the well-known problem that imitation impairs the innovating ﬁrm’s ability to cover its R&D
expenses. However, inter-industry diﬀerences regarding the technical complexity of products imply
that sectors may also diﬀer with respect to the capability to reverse engineer the state-of-the-
art technology. The pace of imitation, in turn, determines how long the leader is able to accrue
monopoly proﬁts. Inter-industry diﬀerences, therefore, have an impact on a market’s natural ability
to compensate innovators and, to that extent, on the necessity of patent protection.
Note that costly innovations are not necessarily costly to imitate. If the correlation between
innovative and imitative costs were close to one, a higher necessity to compensate innovators would
always coincide with a higher naturally inherent capability of the market to do that. In this case
a uniform patent protection might be appropriate, since the need for governmental intervention
would not ﬂuctuate with the sector-speciﬁc diﬀerences in the technical complexity of products. Yet
empirical evidence suggests that the correlation between innovation and imitation costs diﬀers from
sector to sector. While, for instance, literature and music can be copied without considerable costs,
imitating most products is more laborious. Mansﬁeld et al. (1981) ﬁnd that in chemical and drug
industries a vast majority of innovations (project size  $ 1 million) imply imitation costs that are
larger than 60 % of innovation costs. In case of chemicals, for 38 % of new products imitation is even
more expensive than innovation itself, because the technological leader possesses highly specialized
R&D know-how, which is inaccessible to imitators. As opposed to that, in electronics and machinery
industries the majority of new products can be imitated at less than 60 % of innovation costs. Hence,
the threat of losing the technological lead in an industry varies from sector to sector.
Since the goal here is to diﬀerentiate patent strength according to a sector’s necessity to com-
pensate inventors beyond its natural capability to do so, I take the inter-industry diﬀerences in the
discrepancy between innovation and imitation costs found by Mansﬁeld et al. (1981) into account.
In accordance with them, the decisive parameter used here is the amount of imitation costs in per-
cent of innovations costs. In the following, this imitation-innovation costs relation will be denoted
j. Considering the speciﬁc R&D costs function (10), it follows that Gj;innovator 6= Gj;imitator, where
Gj;imitator = j Gj;innovator. Hence, j rescales the R&D cost function (10) according to whether
leader or laggard conducts research. While the leader’s R&D costs remain unchanged to the previ-





This alternative speciﬁcation has crucial repercussions on the optimal research intensities of
neck-to-neck and following ﬁrms ((17) and (18)). Based on (26), it becomes apparent that the
imitator’s ﬁrst order condition becomes
j
j ' 1j = (V0   V 1). Moreover, in Appendix B.5 I show
that the optimal research intensity of a neck-to-neck ﬁrm becomes
22'0j =  [ + hj + ' 1j (1   j)] +
q
[ + hj + ' 1j (1   j)]
2 + 2j (1j   0j) ; (27)
and, similarly, the optimal research intensity of the ﬁrm trying to catch up becomes
' 1j =  ( + hj + '0j) +
s








As opposed to the previous speciﬁcation of the model, in which j = 1, the optimal neck-to-neck
intensity here depends on the laggard’s intensity. This is due to the fact that the special case, in
which the risk of losing the technological lead times the lost value equals the risk of becoming laggard
times the lost value, only applies when imitation and innovation costs are the same (j = 1). The
fact that j is now assumed to ﬂuctuate sector-speciﬁcally complicates the solution of the model.
What is the intuition behind it? j directly enters the optimal laggard’s intensity by lowering
incremental proﬁts (0j    1j) and the term ('0j)2. The former constitute the immediate proﬁts
from imitation, while the latter term represents the additional ﬁrm value from having gained the
opportunity to potentially become the next leader.29 A higher j leads to a decline of both terms
and, to that extent, a decline of the optimal ' 1j, because both types of beneﬁts come at a higher
price. In other words, since according to the imitator’s ﬁrst order condition above, the marginal
cost of research must be equal to the value added, an increase in the imitator’s marginal costs causes
the same level of value added to correspond to a lower optimal research intensity. This yields the
following intuitive result for the direct eﬀect of j on the laggard’s optimal research intensity: a
more complicated reverse engineering induces lower investments in imitative research.
In view of (27), it becomes apparent that j has direct impact on '0j by reducing the threat of
imitation. Since in this speciﬁcation of the model the imitation-innovation costs ratio may deviate
from 1, the term ' 1j (1 j) enters the equation before and under the square root. It represents the
diﬀerence in the threat of falling one step behind in a leader-laggard state (' 1j (V1 V0) = ' 1j
'0j
j )
compared to a neck-to-neck state ('0j (V0   V 1) = '0j
j
j ' 1j). In case of j = 1 the threat of
falling one step behind is the same regardless in which state the sector is situated, because there
is no diﬀerence between innovation and imitation costs. If, however, j deviates from 1, it changes
the leading ﬁrm’s threat of being imitated relative to a neck-to-neck ﬁrm’s threat of falling behind.
Consequently, a higher j corresponds to a higher optimal research intensity of a neck-to-neck ﬁrm.
This is because the threat to imitate the leader decreases relative to the threat for a neck-to-neck
ﬁrm to fall behind, so that incentives to leave the neck-to-neck state increase.
Again, this reasoning only captures the direct eﬀect of j on optimal R&D investment. Yet,
in both cases, direct and indirect eﬀects of j on the optimal intensities go in the same direction.
According to (27), a higher ' 1j lowers optimal neck-to-neck intensity '0j. Since the direct eﬀect
29 The beneﬁt from potentially becoming next leader is the probability of a successful innovation in neck-to-neck









































Figure 6: The growth rate’s reaction to changes in patent length and sector-speciﬁc reverse engineering
capability j in the benchmark case ( = 1:1,  = 0:07, j = 0:8, j = 5).
implies a high ' 1j when j is small, the indirect eﬀect on '0j corroborates the direct eﬀect by
additionally leading to the fact that a small j corresponds to a small optimal neck-to-neck research
intensity. Similarly, the direction of the indirect eﬀect of j on the laggard’s optimal intensity equals
the direct eﬀect’s direction, since a higher j induces a higher '0j which, in turn, lowers ' 1j.
What are the implications of a variation in j on optimal diﬀerentiated patent protection? In
a sector with relatively laborious reverse engineering, '0j exceeds ' 1j, since a higher j lets '0j
increase while ' 1j decreases. Recall from section 2.4.3 that such a sector does not necessarily grow
faster, because with a simultaneously lower ' 1j the sector is less probable to be situated in neck-
to-neck. It follows that in order to beneﬁt from the neck-to-neck ﬁrms’ high propensity to invest in
R&D, it is essential to ease patent protection and, by this means, increase the pace of catching up
(composition eﬀect). Hence, high j correspond to low optimal patent protection. Similarly, small
j imply a high optimal patent strength. This is due to the fact that easier imitation induces a
shorter technological lead, which impairs the innovator’s ability to break even.
Figure 6 illustrates how optimal patent strength varies with the sector-speciﬁc propensity to
imitate.30 It becomes apparent that, as opposed to previous speciﬁcations of the model, growth
does not exhibit an inverted-U relation with respect to hj in any case. This is due to the fact that
for small j the precondition for an inverted-U relation, '0j > ' 1j (Proposition 3b), does not hold.
Since a decline in imitation costs increases the propensity to imitate and, beyond that, lowers the
propensity to innovate, for small j we have that ' 1j > '0j. Moreover, as for j ! 0 the imitation
costs become negligible, we have that lim
j!0
' 1j = 1 and lim
j!0
'0j = 0. As a consequence, the growth
rate tends to zero. Note that this is the fact even with maximal patent protection (hj = 0), because
30 Since the empirical results in Mansﬁeld et al. (1981) imply 0:5 < j < 1:5 to be a realistic range for the
imitation-innovation costs relation, ﬁgure 6 and the ﬁgures in the Appendix focus on that range.
24patents only shield innovators from copying their idea, not from inventing around it. Since the
speciﬁcation of patent protection in this model follows Aghion et al. (2001) and Acemoglu/Akcigit
(2008) by modelling patent length and implicitly assuming a standardized patent breadth, maximal
patent protection implies inﬁnite patent length, while patent breadth remains unchanged. Hence,
patents in this model can only mitigate but not prevent the decomposition of innovation incentives
for extremely small j. Nevertheless, we can summarize the following result, which also is robust to
numerous variations of parameter values (see Appendix B.4).
Result 4. Given a duopolistic sector j, whose growth rate follows (21), a sector-speciﬁc increase
in reverse engineering costs of technologically superior products, i.e., a higher imitation-innovation
costs relation j, where j 2 [0:5;1:5], implies shorter optimal patent lives and vice versa.
4 Conclusion
This paper deals with a step-by-step innovation model of endogenous growth in a Cournot duopoly
set-up. In order to account for previous empirical ﬁndings on industry diﬀerences in the impact
and importance of patents, it is used to scrutinize how sector-speciﬁc parameters can be used
to determine the ﬂexible component of a diﬀerentiated patent regime, and, more speciﬁcally, how
variations in their scale change the optimal (i.e., growth-maximizing) patent length. It is found that
patent protection of a sector ought to be weaker, the more intense its product market competition,
the higher its R&D productivity, and the more laborious imitation by a ﬁrm trying to catch up
are. In the latter case, the model resorts to the imitation-innovation costs relation, empirically
elicited by Mansﬁeld et al. (1981), in order to account for the ease of imitation. It is found that
for most empirically plausible relations the inverted-U relation between patent length and growth,
carries over from Bertrand competition to the Cournot set-up. Only in sectors with inherently easy
imitation the composition eﬀect disappears, so that it is optimal to grant maximum patent length.
The model takes a ﬁrst step towards a theoretical basis for an assessment of industry-speciﬁc
modiﬁcations of patent length already implemented in practice (e.g., supplementary protection
certiﬁcates and pediatric exclusivity). Recall from the introduction that supplementary protection
certiﬁcates aim at compensating inventors in pharmaceutical and biotech industries for the loss of
eﬀective patent term due to regulatory delays in the launch of new products. However, the fact,
that this concerns subsequent innovations as well, prolongs the opportunity to accrue proﬁts and
casts the necessity for additional protection into doubt. Since the model proposes a diﬀerentiation
of patent length according to how much and how long the innovation yields proﬁt, it accounts for
this dynamic aspect of the evaluation of supplementary protection certiﬁcates, and, to that extent,
can provide a theoretical basis for empirical studies on the necessity to grant them.
A common objection to previous propositions of a diﬀerentiated patent regime is that implemen-
tation costs will overcompensate the undoubtly existent social beneﬁt of such a system. While for
25low aggregation levels (e.g., ﬁrm or project level) it seems diﬃcult to remedy these concerns, three
reasons come to mind for why regarding a sector-speciﬁc diﬀerentiation they lack persuasive power.
Firstly, since, as mentioned before, the current system already comprises a speciﬁc protection for
some sectors, part of the corresponding implementation costs accrue anyway. Secondly, in contrast
to the ﬁrm or project level, an industry-speciﬁc diﬀerentiation does not require a reevaluation of
patent strength for every single application, which implies signiﬁcantly less costs. Yet it, still, can
eﬃciently approximate diﬀerences in the necessity to compensate inventors, since parameters con-
stituting these diﬀerences either exhibit a sector-speciﬁc nature or, as numerous empirical studies
indicate, are comparatively easy to obtain on a sectoral level. Thirdly, the current country-speciﬁc
patent system includes implementation costs, that would not accrue under the proposed sector-
speciﬁc system. Even though WTO member countries under TRIPs agreed on a uniform patent
length, application, grant and litigation of patents usually fall under the jurisdiction of every mem-
ber country, each having to bear the corresponding costs. Within Europe, the European Patent
Convention (EPC) aims at lowering these costs by harmonizing patent applications and grants.
However, since the EPC does not include a joint judicial authority, litigations remain under each
country’s jurisdiction. Hence, a European patent is no single, centrally enforceable patent but
rather a bundle of patents with ambiguous legal certainty. The related costs could be avoided by a
transnational uniform system of a sector-speciﬁc diﬀerentiation, in which countries potentially co-
operate to scrutinize a sector’s optimal patent length. It follows that, only if implementation costs
of the proposed system exceed costs of the current one by a higher amount than its social beneﬁt,
the above objection applies. The given reasons lead us to the conclusion that this is unlikely the
case. Nevertheless, the veriﬁcation of this conclusion deserves further study.
Possible extensions of the model include a speciﬁcation which accounts for the whole range
of patent design mechanisms besides patent length. The paper follows Aghion et al. (2001) and
Acemoglu/Akcigit (2008) by modelling patent length explicitly, while implicitly assuming a stan-
dardized patent breadth. Since the latter cannot be inﬂuenced by patent policy decisions in the
model, maximal patent protection cannot entirely shield innovators from imitation. Firms trying
to catch up can still imitate by inventing around the technological leader’s design. Because patent
breadth (leading or lagging) determines how much eﬀort the inventing around implies, its consider-
ation enables us to model maximal patent protection to entirely shield innovators from imitation.
This might have interesting implications on optimal patent strength in a ﬂexible regime.
Moreover, one might extend the model by additionally taking secrecy, lead time advantages, and
the use of complementary marketing and manufacturing capabilities as alternative means to protect
ideas from imitation into account. Empirical studies, such as Levin et al. (1987) and Cohen et al.
(2000), suggest that, most notably, secrecy is more important in this regard. Since patents include
a disclosure of technical details of an invention after a certain period of protection, simply keeping
a lid on the idea is an eﬀective alternative to protect intellectual property. Accounting for it might
yield interesting results regarding optimal diﬀerentiated patent protection.
26Appendices
Appendix A (section 2)
A.1
Objective. Given (8), show that ninflection > 0.
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4 :
The next step is to set this expression equal to zero and solve for ninflection. The resulting expression only








is not deﬁned for j = 1. Hence, again, I take the second
derivate of (8), but instead of solving for ninflection directly, I evaluate the expression at j = 1 and, then,
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< 1, both expressions can be shown to be positive for any  > 1 and for each










so the inﬂection points exist.
A.2







Proof. Without the one-step lead assumption, each industry j experiences a cycle, expressed by the sequence
f0;1;:::;   1;;0g where  2 N, so that lnXj grows at rate  ln between the beginning and the end of
that cycle.  can be interpreted as the number of technology steps the industry moved forward per cycle.
With the one-step lead assumption we have that  = 1, so that for a long time interval we can write
lnXj  Vj (ln), where Vj is the number of cycles that industry j experiences within the time interval




t , which follows from
the aggregate growth rate g = lim
t!1
j lnXj



















= 1j (' 1j + hj)(ln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underlies the stationarity condition that the ﬂow out of a state must equal its inﬂow. Since the laggard is
always able to close the whole technological gap at once, the frequency of a cycle with  steps equals the
27probability 1j of being in leader-laggard state times the Poisson arrival rate of falling back into neck-to-neck,
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Objective. Under the premise that Proposition 1 holds and given that  > 0, j > 0, and hj > 0, show
that for the optimal research intensities (17) and (18) holds true that a) '0j > 0 and ' 1j > 0, and b)
'0j > ' 1j.
Proof. I begin by proving a). From Proposition 1 and the fact that all parameters are positive, it follows that
the square roots in the optimal research intensities (17) and (18) are greater than zero. Even if (1j   0j)
and (0j    1j) were not greater than but equal to zero, the positive squared part under the roots would
compensate the negative ﬁrst part of the expressions. Consequently, we can infer '0j > 0. Since we can
apply the same procedure to the optimal laggard intensity, we also have that ' 1j > 0.
In order to prove b), I use (15) and (16) to show that the optimal neck-to-neck R&D intensity is strictly
greater than the optimal laggard R&D intensity, if and only if the diﬀerence of leader and neck-to-neck ﬁrm
values is strictly greater than the diﬀerence of neck-to-neck and laggard ﬁrm values, so
'0j > ' 1j , (V1j   V0j) > (V0j   V 1j) ; (30)
Hence, we can prove b) by proving the term on the r.h.s. Using (12), (13) and (14), we can write












Substracting (32) from (31) and combining similar terms yields






= 1j   20j +  1j : (33)
According to Proposition 1, the r.h.s. of (33) is strictly greater than zero. Using (15) and (16), we replace
'0j by j (V1j  V0j) and ' 1j by j (V0j  V 1j). Moreover, for notational simplicity we set X = (V1j  V0j)
and Y = (V0j   V 1j). This yields





j X 2 + ( + hj)X >
j
2
Y2 + j X Y + ( + hj)Y : (34)
28Based on (34), we can prove by contradiction that X > Y must hold. Supposing X  Y, (34) simpliﬁes to
i) X = Y ) j X 2 + ( + hj)X >
j
2
X 2 + j X 2 + ( + hj)Y , 0 >
j
2
X 2 ! contradiction
ii) X < Y ) j X 2 + ( + hj)X >
j
2




(X + E)2 + j X E + ( + hj)E ! contradiction
Because j > 0, E > 0, X > 0, and since from a) we have that '0j > 0, both expressions imply a
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'0j +  + hj
: (35)
Since '0j > 0, it becomes apparent that this expression is strictly less than zero, so
@'0j
@hj < 0. Moreover,
for large hj it tends to zero, so that lim
hj!1
'0j = 0. To see this, note that in (17) the expression under the
square root is always positive and strictly greater than the negative expression before the square root, since
incremental proﬁts are always positive. Yet the latter terms fade into the background as hj becomes large,




















( + hj(j) + '0j)2 + 2j (0j    1j) + ('0j)2 : (36)
For the sake of clarity, I set
p
( + hj(j) + '0j)2 + 2j (0j    1j) + ('0j)2 =
p
 , so that again from
(18) we can write
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' 1j +  + hj + '0j
: (37)
Furthermore, analogue to above, it can be shown that lim
hj!1
@' 1j
@hj = 0. This immediately follows from the
fact that lim
hj!1
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2'0j + ' 1j + hj
(38)
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2 :
We can use equations (35) and (37) to further simplify (38). Note the similarity of (36) and the complicated
expressions in the squared brackets in (38). Hence, we can utilize (37) (as a more manageable (36)) and
substitute the expressions in squared brackets by
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Objective. Show that ceteris paribus the growth rate exhibits an ambivalent reaction to changes of hj.




@hj > 0 for small hj. Since the ﬁrst term on the r.h.s. of (22)
is always positive, it is suﬃcient to scrutinize the sign of the second term on the r.h.s. (term in squared
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1
A > 0 :




@hj for small hj, it is suﬃcient to show that the inequality is greater than
zero for hj = 0. The reason for this is that hj = 0 corresponds to a point compared to which the inﬂection
point of the inverted-U, constituting the ambivalent behavior of g
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 1j  + ' 1j 2 > 1 : (39)
30In the last line it becomes apparent, that  simply scales up the expression on the l.h.s. of (39). This is












0j ' 1j+2'0j ' 1j +'2
 1j +' 1j 2 > 0 immediately follows from '0j > 0,
' 1j > 0, and   0. Consequently, if the inequality (39) holds for  = 0, then it must hold for  > 0
a fortiori. Again, we are able to reduce the expression by setting an exogenous parameter to zero, so that
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@hj > 0 holds for hj = 0 under the condition that '0j > ' 1j (Proposition 3).
We can prove this by contradiction, supposing that '0j  ' 1j. In this case (40) becomes












> 1 , 1 > 1 ! contradiction
b) '0j < ' 1j )
2'3
0j ('0j + ")
('0j + ")3 '0j + '2






0j " + 4'2
0j "2 + '0j "3 > 1
, 2'4
0j + 2'3
0j " > 2'4
0j + 2'3
0j " +   ! contradiction
where   = 3'3
0j "+4'2
0j "2 +'0j "3 > 0. b) uses the fact that, if '0j < ' 1j, there is an inﬁnitesimal " > 0
that can be added to '0j in order to yield ' 1j, which implies that ('0j + ") = ' 1j. Since '0j > 0 and
" > 0,   must be strictly greater than zero, so the right hand side cannot be smaller than the left hand side.




@hj > 0, if hj is suﬃciently small.




@hj < 0 for large hj. Using (22) and
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If the inequality holds for hj = 1, there is at least one hj for which the direction of the above unequal sign






since, as we have seen before, lim
hj!1
'0j = 0 and lim
hj!1
' 1j = 0. Taking the limit of the ﬁrst term on the






because the numerator tends to zero for large hj. This leaves us with enough information to conﬁrm that







< 1. Consequently, we can state








@hj < 0. Changes in patent protection, therefore,
cause growth to exhibit an ambivalent reaction.







Proof. According to (8), we can write the incremental proﬁts as
1j   0j =
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which, for notational simplicity, we rewrite to
@(1j 0j)
@j = 1
4 +B( 1) C( 1). Similarly, we take the ﬁrst
















Again, we simplify the following notations by rewriting to
@(0j  1j)
@j =  1
4   B() + C().
Since  is strictly greater than 1 and  ln( 1





@j , we can, therefore, focus on showing that 1
4 + B( 1) >  1









B() =  0:25 and lim
!1B() = 0 ;
and because B( 1) and B() are always smaller than zero, it becomes apparent that for the given assumption
of  > 1
1
4
+ B( 1) > 0 while  
1
4
  B() < 0 :












  B() + C() ;
which concludes the proof.
32B.2
Objective. Show that Results 1 and 2 are robust to variations of the extant parameters ( and j).
Numerical Calibration. Besides the benchmark case of benchmark = 1:1, I will vary  similarly to the calibra-
tion in Acemoglu/Akcigit (2008), where  = 1:01,  = 1:05 and  = 1:2. Also, apart from j;benchmark = 5,
I will check for robustness using j = 0:1 and j = 10. Note that since Mehra/Prescott (1985) found that
r(t) = 0:07, I ﬁx  to that rate throughout the calibration.
































































































































33Note that I chose to keep the scale of hj ﬁxed in order to ensure comparability, although in the cases where
j = 0:1 Results 1 and 2 could be seen more easily by rescaling hj.




















































































































It becomes apparent that the inverted-U relation between growth (Result 1) and the direction of its reaction
to changes in product market competition j (Result 2) are robust to several parameter variations.
34B.3
Objective. Show that Results 1 and 3 are robust to variations of the extant parameters ( and j).
Numerical Calibration. Besides the benchmark case of benchmark = 1:1, I will vary  similarly to the calibra-
tion in Acemoglu/Akcigit (2008), where  = 1:01,  = 1:05 and  = 1:2. Also, apart from j;benchmark = 0:8,
I will check for robustness using j = 0:1 and j = 1, since j 2 (0;1]. As above,  = 0:07 throughout the
calibration.




























































































































35Note that, as above, I chose to keep the scale of hj ﬁxed in order to ensure comparability, although in the
cases where j = 0:1 Results 1 and 3 could be seen more easily by rescaling hj.


















































































































It becomes apparent that the inverted-U relation between growth (Result 1) and the direction of its reaction
to changes in R&D productivity j (Result 3) are robust to parameter variations.
36B.4
Objective. Show that Result 4 is robust to variations of the extant parameters ( and j).
Numerical Calibration. Besides the benchmark case of benchmark = 1:1, I will vary  similarly to the calibra-
tion in Acemoglu/Akcigit (2008), where  = 1:01,  = 1:05 and  = 1:2. Also, apart from j;benchmark = 0:8,
I will check for robustness using j = 0:1 and j = 1, since j 2 (0;1]. As above,  = 0:07 throughout the
calibration and j will be ﬁxed to the benchmark value 5.




























































































































37Note that, as above, I chose to keep the scale of hj ﬁxed in order to ensure comparability, although in the
cases where j = 0:1 Result 4 could be seen more easily by rescaling hj.











































































































































It becomes apparent that the direction of the reaction of the growth rate’s maximum to changes in the
laggard’s reverse engineering capability j (Result 4) is robust to several parameter variations.
38B.5
Objective. Under the premise that the imitator’s R&D costs follow (26), show that the optimal research
intensity of a neck-to-neck ﬁrm is given by (27) and the optimal research intensity of a following ﬁrm is given
by (28).
Proof. Recall from section 2.4.2 that the leading ﬁrm’s value function is
V1 = 1j   (e ' 1j + hj)[V1   V0] ; (12)







+ '0j [V1   V0]   e '0j [V0   V 1] : (13)








+ (' 1j + hj)[V0   V 1] : (42)
While the ﬁrst order condition of a neck-to-neck ﬁrms remains unchanged (see (15)), as shown in section
3.4, the laggard’s ﬁrst order condition becomes
j
j
' 1j = (V0   V 1) : (43)
Based on this, we can derive the laggard’s optimal research intensity. Using (43) and inserting (13) and



















(' 1j)2 + (' 1j + hj)[V0   V 1]

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0 = (' 1j)2 + 2' 1j ( + hj + '0j)  
2j
j




enables us to solve for the alternative proﬁt maximizing R&D intensity of the laggard
' 1j =  ( + hj + '0j) +
s





















+ '0j [V1   V0]   e '0j [V0   V 1]

:





















After rearranging this expression to
0 = ('0j)2 + 2'0j [ + hj + ' 1j (1   j)]   2j (1j   0j) ;
we can solve for the alternative proﬁt maximizing R&D intensity of a neck-to-neck ﬁrm
'0j =  [ + hj + ' 1j (1   j)] +
q
[ + hj + ' 1j (1   j)]
2 + 2j (1j   0j) :
This concludes the proof and the Appendices.
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